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in the Health Sector
There has been considerable concern in
the international development community
about aid displacement in the health
sector. That is, a concern that foreign aid
to the health sector leads to a displacement
or diversion of government funds from the
health sector. Foreign aid, also known as
development assistance, includes funding
from international development agencies
in donor countries, multilateral agencies
like the World Bank and Global Fund, and
private sources. The concern about dis-
placement penetrates questions about the
strings attached to aid, the monitoring of
aid, and whether aid should be given to
governments in the first place. A core
question being asked is, does development
assistance for health increase health spend-
ing? Or, do aid funds merely displace
government funding for health?
Questioning the Argument That
Health Aid Leads to Reduced
Government Investment in
Health
Concerns about aid displacement are as
old as development assistance. As a
leading World Bank economist famously
said in 1947, ‘‘When the World Bank
thinks it is financing an electric power
station, it is really financing a brothel.’’ [1]
More recently, experts commenting in the
press have suggested, ‘‘When an aid
official thinks he [sic] is helping a low-
income African patient avoid charges at a
health clinic, in reality, he is paying for a
shopping trip to Paris for a government
minister and his wife [2].’’ The concerns—
and the cynicism— about foreign aid
being displaced and diverted for less-
than-noble purposes have been in place
the last 60 years.
Some analysis has been done to assess
the scale of aid displacement in different
sectors and countries. In one analysis,
World Bank economists examined aid to
18 African countries from 1971 to 1995,
and found that for every US dollar of aid
received, government spending increased
by US$0.90 [1]. That study also found
that some aid intended for capital im-
provements, like the building of hospitals,
went to operations and to the repayment
of past loans. But across sectors and
regions, the evidence for aid displacement
is mixed. For example education aid was
found to have no discernible effect on
education spending worldwide; however,
each US dollar in education aid in Africa
led to nearly US$1.00 increase in educa-
tion spending [1].
Country analyses have also identified
great variation in the extent of displace-
ment. One study showed that aid to India
‘‘merely substitutes for spending that the
government would have undertaken any-
way,’’ concluding that ‘‘funds freed by aid
are spent on non-development activities
[3].’’ In contrast, a study of aid to
Vietnam’s transportation sector found that
aid stayed within that sector [4].
Recently, attention has turned to
whether health aid increases government
health spending. In 2009, Farag and
colleagues found that from 1995 to 2006,
each US dollar increase in development
assistance for health (DAH) to low-income
countries was associated with a US$0.14
decrease in government health spending
[5]. A subsequent analysis by Lu and
colleagues made the case that for every
additional US dollar of DAH from 1995 to
2006, government health expenditures
from domestic sources fell by at least
US$0.43 [6]. This latter study is refer-
enced frequently in conversations with
decision-makers at aid agencies as a
cautionary note about DAH. The analysis
appears to have reinforced skepticism
about health aid.
A closer look at the analysis by Lu and
colleagues, using data made available in
May 2011 [7], shows that the association
between DAH and displacement of gov-
ernment health expenditures is not robust
after exclusion of a small subset of data.
The trends are driven by outliers, and
country data cluster and follow widely
divergent trends (Figure 1). The primary
finding by Lu and colleagues, which we
are challenging here, is the negative
relationship between government health
expenditure (GHE-S)/gross domestic
product (GDP) and DAH-Gov/GDP.
GHE-S/GDP is government health
spending from domestic sources as a
percentage of GDP for a country in each
year from 1995 to 2006. DAH-gov/GDP
is development assistance for health dis-
bursed to government as a percentage of
GDP for each country in each year from
1995 to 2006. Using Lu and colleagues’
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Institute for Health Metrics and Evalua-
tion (IHME) data on DAH [8], we
replicated their results and found that the
linear relationship between DAH and
government health expenditure from do-
mestic sources is lost when country-years
in which World Health Organization
(WHO) and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimates differ by 10-fold or more
are removed, when a small set of implau-
sible data points are removed, and when
restricting the sample to eliminate those
countries that receive very little DAH as a
percentage of GDP. In sum, any linear
relationship that exists among the data is
too tenuous to be a basis for policy.
Re-evaluating the Data:
Inconsistencies and Omissions
Much debate surrounded the initial
publication of the paper by Lu and
colleagues, but those engaged in the
correspondence acknowledged that they
were challenging neither the overall find-
ings nor the data [9,10]. Since publication,
the data’s reliability and heterogeneity
have been called into question: nearly half
of the observations are missing for low-
income countries [11], making a reliance
on modeled estimates and imputation
essential. As Lu and colleagues acknowl-
edge, there is only a 65% correlation
between the two main data sources, WHO
and IMF. In 29 country-year observations,
the ratio between WHO and IMF esti-
mates is greater than 10 (Table 1). In
addition to questionable data, Lu and
colleagues leave out of the analysis 51
countries that IHME previously analyzed
as recipients of DAH, including Russia
and much of Eastern Europe, Iraq,
Afghanistan, the occupied Palestinian
territory, Somalia, and several small Island
states (Box 1) [12].
Even if we accept the concerns about
data consistency and accept the highly
imputed data, the relationship between
DAH and GHE-S is not stable to the
exclusion of a few data points. We
replicated the author’s fixed effects model
(Arellano-Bover/Blundell Bond model).
We confirmed their main results, but we
Summary Points
N At the core of the current aid debate is the question of whether development
assistance for health provided to developing country governments increases
health expenditures.
N It has recently been suggested that development assistance for health to
governments leads to a displacement of government spending, reinforcing
skepticism about health aid.
N Here we examine a database of public financing for health from 1995 to 2006
and demonstrate that prior conclusions drawn from these data are unstable
and driven by outliers.
N While government spending may be displaced by development assistance for
health in some settings, the evidence is not robust and is highly variable across
countries. We recommend that current evidence about aid displacement
cannot be used to guide policy.
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Figure 1. Primary data scatter of the relationship between DAH and GHE-S in all countries. Both DAH and GHE-S are presented here as a
percentage of GDP, with GHE-S based on IMF data. Each point on the above plot represents a country-year observation used in the analysis. Data
source: IHME [2].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001214.g001
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results to the exclusion of questionable
data. The associations failed significance
testing at p=0.05 when excluding the
lowest 10% of GHE-S using the IMF data
and the lowest 20% of the WHO data.
Given the concerns about Lu and
colleagues’ model choice, we repeated the
analysis using an alternative statistical model
to assess the robustness of the relationship
between DAH and GHE-S. We used
ordinary least squares regression with coun-
try fixed effects, clustered by country, for the
main model estimation of the association
between DAH and GHE-S. We avoided
random effects estimation because the aid
literature suggests that the differences in the
manner in which countries handle aid funds
are structural (‘‘fixed’’) and idiosyncratic, so
an exchangeability assumption seemed in-
appropriate. Countries have different means
of interacting with donors: some require
donors to buy into and contribute toward a
national plan (e.g., India), while others allow
donors freedom to implement projects with
few constraints (e.g., Tanzania) [13]. Coun-
tries also have differences in national
institutions that collect, disseminate, and
report on foreign assistance. These fixed
differences may be beneath the wide
variation seen in country trends (Figure 2).
Furthermore, donors take widely varying
strategies toward liaising with government.
For example, while World Bank funding
largely goes through official government
channels, the United States Government’s
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) had largely bypassed recipient
country budget-planning procedures in its
effort to achieve a rapid scale-up of HIV/
AIDS programs [14].
We tested the sensitivity of the results to
the exclusion of observations from years
where recipient governments were calcu-
lated to spend less than 0.01% of GDP
from domestic sources on health. In a
country with a GDP per capita of
US$1,000, this means that the government
is spending less than US$0.10 of non-
donor money on health per capita. The
IHME data show that GHE-S is less than
0.01% of GDP in 47 (out of over 1,200)
country-year observations using IMF data
and in 8 country-year observations using
WHO data (Table 2). The linear associa-
tion between DAH and GHE-S as per-
centage of GDP is not significant after
excluding these observations. According to
IMF data, Rwanda has had such near-
complete displacement every year from
1997 to 2006. Cambodia, Ethiopia, and
Guinea-Bissau follow a very similar trend
to Rwanda, all showing near-complete
displacement every year. If real, such
Box 1. DAH-Receiving Countries Omitted from Study by Lu and
Colleagues [6]
Afghanistan
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Cook Islands
Croatia
Cuba
Dominica
Estonia
Falkland Islands
Gibraltar
Grenada
Honduras
Iraq
Kiribati
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Marshall Islands
Mayotte
Micronesia
Moldova
Montenegro
Montserrat
Myanmar
Nauru
Niue
Northern Mariana Islands
Palau
Palestinian Territory, occupied
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Saint Helena
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe
Serbia
Seychelles
Somalia
Timor-Leste
Tokelau
Tonga
Turks and Caicos Islands
Tuvala
Ukraine
Wallis and Fortuna
Yugoslavia
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 3 May 2012 | Volume 9 | Issue 5 | e1001214complete displacement suggests alternative
national priorities, and donors could seek
alternative approaches to aligning their
priorities with those of the recipient
government. If we exclude these observa-
tions where GHE-S is less than 0.01%,
there is no longer a statistically significant
linear relationship between GHE-S and
DAH.
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Figure 2. Widely divergent trends in the relationship between DAH and GHE-S in select countries. Both DAH and GHE-S are presented
here as a percentage of GDP, with GHE-S based on IMF data. In Rwanda, GHE-S is effectively zero, regardless of DAH. In Lesotho, GHE-S appears to rise
with DAH (aid is associated with additional GHE-S). Eritrea exhibits erratic response, while Zambia generally follows the predictions of Lu and
colleagues about decreasing government expenditure with increasing DAH. Data source: IHME [2].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001214.g002
Table 1. Observations where the ratio of WHO to IMF estimates of government health expenditure from domestic sources as a
percentage of GDP (GHE-S/GDP) is greater than 10.
Country Ratio of WHO to IMF GHE-S
Central African Republic, 2002 1,600.98
Suriname, 2001, 2004, 1996, 2005, 2003, 1999 108.98, 104.12, 84.15, 35.08, 32.21, 15.52
Laos, 1998 54.20
Rwanda, 1996, 1995 44.57, 15.83
Cambodia, 2006, 2000 37.55, 23.27
Guinea, 2003, 2000 34.75
Burundi, 2002 33.84
Mozambique, 2004 24.78
Costa Rica, 1995, 1997, 2006, 2003, 2004, 2002, 1999 19.56, 18.16, 17.80, 16.47, 16.10, 15.94, 13.05
Malawi, 2000, 2003 13.43, 10.15
Niger, 1996 12.81
Laos, 1997 12.41
Fiji, 1998 11.58
Equatorial Guinea, 2000 10.93
WHO estimates exceed IMF estimates in about two-thirds of observations. However, there are also notable country-years in which WHO estimates are more than 10-fold
lower than IMF estimates, including: Guinea-Bissau, 1995 (ratio of 0); Eritrea in 2003 (ratio of 0.047).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001214.t001
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ing the association between DAH and
GHE-S as a percentage of GDP when
DAH to government is greater than or
equal to 0.5% of national GDP are not
significant. That is, countries that receive
a substantial amount of DAH show little
evidence of displacement. Notably, just
under half of DAH is given to countries
receiving greater than or equal to 0.5% of
GDP as DAH (Table 3). DAH to
governments is not displaced when aid
makes a large (greater than or equal to
0.5% of GDP) contribution to health
spending. This calls into question the
argument that governments displace aid
because they are not able to absorb it. It
appears that aid displacement trends,
even if we accept all the flawed data,
are driven by those countries that receive
very small amounts of aid for health, as
the relationship is absent if we look at
country-years in which aid makes up
0.5% of GDP or greater (Table 4).
The Current Evidence on Aid
Displacement Cannot Guide
Policy
First, even if displacement does exist,
there is no evidence that it is a bad thing.
A large-scale empirical analysis found no
evidence that non-fungible sectoral aid
(that is, aid earmarked or otherwise
dedicated to its intended purposes) works
better than fungible aid, when ‘‘better’’ is
understood as economic growth, spending
in pro-poor sectors, or reductions in infant
mortality [15]. In Vietnam’s health sector,
Wagstaff found that project-level outcomes
are not harmed by displacement of
government funding, suggesting that gov-
ernments aim to shift spending to support
projects where additional investments
provide the greatest improvements [16].
Furthermore, as a recent analysis of health
financing in Honduras, Rwanda, and
Thailand showed that these countries
increased their domestic spending from
domestic sources in response to increases
in donor funding, a finding based on close
examination of country-spending that is at
sharp odds with the cross-country conclu-
sions [17]. This study also found that
donors were likely to shift funds in the face
of increasing resources from the Global
Fund. This finding raises the possibility
that some of the measured ‘‘displacement’’
is exogenous; that is, countries are shifting
resources in response to anticipated,
promised, or real changes in DAH. Aid
displacement may be a reasonable ap-
proach for governments to improve the
societal benefits of resource allocation
decisions when development assistance is
volatile or threatened. Even if we accept
Lu and colleagues finding that DAH to
NGOs undergoes less displacement (and
thus, increases government health expen-
diture), this likely reflects the fact that
NGOs are less likely to be burdened by the
risks of aid volatility; and, since NGO
salaries tend to be higher, they may drive
up public sector health wages and in turn
government expenditures (see Text S1 for
an analysis of the vulnerability of this
finding).
Given the concerns raised over data
plausibility and completeness, conclusions
about the mean relationship between
DAH and government health spending
should be called into question. While there
does appear to be an association, it is too
tenuous, too dependent on problematic
model selection, and inconsistent (even
among individual countries) to be used for
policy or resource-allocation decisions. We
show that there is no significant aid
displacement when government health
expenditures from domestic sources ex-
ceed 0.01% of GDP, and no evidence of
aid displacement when DAH exceeds
0.5% of GDP (Table 4).
No statistical model can adequately
compensate for systematically wrong and
missing data. While Lu and colleagues
have gathered the best available data, and
have been fully transparent in sharing
their datasets and methods, the reality is
that we still lack a sufficient accounting of
public financing on health to make any
conclusions on overall trends. Of course,
some displacement of aid from the health
sector may occur. It would be rational for
governments seeking to improve the
distribution of limited national resources,
and seeking to avoid interruptions in
health service provision with annual fluc-
Table 2. Country-years in which GHE-S/GDP ,0.0001 in IMF and WHO data.
Country Years Using IMF Data Years Using WHO Data
Burundi 2002–2006 2003–2006
Cambodia 1995, 1998, 2003–2005 —
Central African Republic 2002, 2004 —
Comoros 2005 —
Ethiopia 2003, 2005, 2006 —
Guinea 2004–2006 —
Guinea-Bissau 2001–2004, 2006 1995, 2001, 2006
Laos 1999, 2005 2005
Madagascar 2004 —
Malawi 2004 —
Mozambique 1995–1997 —
Rwanda 1997–2006 —
Suriname 1995 —
Tanzania 2004–2006 —
The Gambia 2005 —
Zambia 2003–2004 —
If these data points are excluded, the relationship between GHE-S and DAH is no longer statistically significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001214.t002
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Country Years
Angola 1995, 2001
Armenia 2000
Benin 1999–2001, 2003, 2004
Bhutan 1997–2000
Bolivia 2003–2004
Burkina Faso 2000, 2001, 2005
Burundi 2002–2006
Cambodia 1995–1998, 2000–2006
Cape Verde 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006
Central African Republic 1999–2002, 2004
Chad 1997–2004
Comoros 1995–2000, 2002
Congo, Democratic Republic 2000, 2001, 2003–2006
Djibouti 1997–2000, 2005, 2006
Equatorial Guinea 2003–2004
Eritrea 1995–2006
Ethiopia 2001–2006
Fiji 2003
Ghana 2000–2006
Guinea 2006
Guinea-Bissau 1996–1998, 2000–2006
Guyana 2003–2006
Haiti 1995–2004
Kenya 2001–2006
Kyrgyzstan 2000, 2003–2006
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1999–2000, 2003–2006
Lesotho 2001–2006
Madagascar 2004–2005
Malawi 1995–2006
Mali 1995–2006
Mongolia 1999, 2001
Mozambique 1995–2006
Namibia 2002, 2006
Nepal 1998–2004
Nicaragua 1997–2006
Niger 1995–1997, 2004–2006
Papua New Guinea 1996, 2000–1005
Rwanda 1999–2006
Samoa 1998, 2001–2005
Senegal 1999–2005
Sierra Leone 2003–2006
Suriname 1995–1999, 2000–2005
Swaziland 2003, 2005
Tajikistan 2003–2004
Tanzania 1995–2006
The Gambia 2005, 2006
Trinidad and Tobago 2006
Uganda 1996, 1998–2006
Zambia 1996–2006
Zimbabwe 2003–2006
Limiting the analysis to these country-years (comprising 47% of all DAH) reveals no significant relationship between DAH and GHE-S.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001214.t003
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 6 May 2012 | Volume 9 | Issue 5 | e1001214tuations in aid to avoid a rapid rise in
health sector spending. However, our
findings should relieve donors of the need
to make unrealistic demands on recipient
governments, and of the pressure to divert
resources to NGOs. While in some settings
aid likely is displaced from the health
sector, we call into question the assertions
that donor health funds are being system-
atically displaced and misused.
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